Firefighter Paul A. Brotherton Rescue 1	Firefighter Timothy P. Jackson Ladder 2	Firefighter Jeremiah M. Lucey Rescue 1
Firefighter James F. Lyons, III Engine 3	Firefighter Joseph T. McGuirk Engine 3	Lieutenant Thomas E. Spencer Ladder 2

On the evening of December 3, 1999, a fire erupted in the abandoned Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse building located in Worcester, Massachusetts. A passerby on the adjacent elevated I-290 highway reported by phone that smoke was showing from the roof of the building. At 1813 hours Box 1438 was struck and a 1st alarm assignment was dispatched to the scene. By the time the fire was brought under control the next day, five alarms would be struck, off-duty personnel would be recalled, mutual aid companies would respond from surrounding towns, and the building would tragically claim the lives of six of Worcester Fire Department's bravest.

 The original structure had been built in 1906 and occupied until 1988 when at that time, the cold storage business using the building moved out. The building fell victim to vandalism and was used by the homeless after the building was closed down in 1989. By December 1999, a homeless couple were intermittently using the 2nd floor office area of the abandoned building for shelter.

According to statements given by the homeless couple to investigators, the woman had recently moved out but returned on the evening of December 3rd to gather some belongings. Her boyfriend was there and a shoving match ensued which resulted in a lit candle being knocked-off a milk crate and into a pile of clothes igniting them. The couple attempted to extinguish the fire but were unsuccessful as the fire began to grow, fueled by other combustible materials in the room. The couple then exited the building and never reported the fire to anyone. To the investigators best guess, the fire could have been burning for as much as one hour and forty-five minutes before smoke was first spotted coming from the roof.

Within minutes of the dispatch, the first arriving unit Engine 1 reported "heavy smoke showing." As a team from Engine 1 prepared to enter the building to search for the fire, the first of many difficulties presented itself. The square brick building had almost no windows or discerning features from the outside, making an external size-up of the building impossible. Also, the very limited amount of windows left virtually no emergency egress points should they be needed. Crews went to work establishing a water supply, preparing to attack the fire, and to search the many floors for access, orientation, and the fire.

View of the "A" and "B" sides at 1825 hours.

Car 3 arrived on-scene minutes later, established command, and immediately requested a second alarm. Almost simultaneously at 1820 hours, two crews radio command and report back that they had found the fire. Engine 13 reported that they have fire in the elevator shaft on the 2nd and 3rd floors. This shaft was venting the smoke scene from the highway. Ladder 1 then radioed that they had found a "room full of fire" in the second floor office area. With the fire located, hose lines were advanced to battle the flames.

At 1824 hours, command is informed that the owner of the dinner next door has reported that two people may be inside the building. Several minutes later, Rescue 1's Lieutenant is asked if he has seen the two people reported to be living in the building. He replies the second and third floor search was negative and they were moving up to the fourth. Rescue is also asked about any fire extension to the third floor which he replies there is smoke but no fire.

By now, several hand lines had been advanced to the fire on the second floor and suppression efforts were ongoing. Reports were that the heat was intense but conditions were still tenable. Also noted was that the smoke throughout the building was light enough to still allow firefighters to see.

	By 1842 hours the smoke venting from the roof had noticeably increased.

At 1840 hours the third alarm was struck. Six minutes later Engine 12 orders all firefighters operating on the 2nd floor to get back to the staircase as the conditions had deteriorated badly. Personnel operating in the area would later report that the conditions went from moderate to completely untenable in a matter of only two minutes.

Immediately after Engine 12's transmission, a team from Rescue 1 started to call for help. They had been working down from the roof and had become lost. A search was initiated although there was much confusion as to what floor they are actually on. The team further desperately states that they are out of air.

 The Captain from Engine 1 repeats an evacuation order for the 2nd floor as conditions continue to quickly worsen. The smoke and heat are banking down and fire is starting to run horizontal across the ceiling.

A fourth alarm is struck at 1852 hours. The lost firefighters are told to activate their PASS alarms (personal alarm safety systems) at 1855 and they reply "they are activated". This was their last radio transmission.

The Interior Operations Officer started to assign newly-arrived companies to fire suppression and search and rescue duties. The driver from Engine 3 had been left behind to put on his turnout gear and SCBA (self-contained breathing apparatus) with another firefighter. As the other firefighters from Engine 3 entered the ground floor they were instructed to go get spare SCBA bottles before going upstairs to search. As they exitted via another way from what they entered, Ladder 2's crew entered and was assigned to go search the 5th floor. It is believed that the remaining two firefighters from Engine 3 entered the building and didn't see their crew, and then attached themselves to Ladder 2.

Suppression crews continued to attack the fire from another stairwell. Even with three hand lines flowing, they were making no progress. In addition, wires were beginning to fall from the ceiling and entangle the crews.

At 1903 hours the search team consisting of Ladder 2/Engine 3 radios Command and reports that they are continuing to search the 5th floor for the down firefighters. Even though it is believed they are in the vicinity of Rescue 1's team, no one ever reports hearing a PASS alarm. A few minutes later the Ladder 2 Lieutenant from the combined team requests assistance in finding the stairwell as conditions were degrading rapidly. The other team from Engine 3 who had already exited the building hears the request and radios Command that they will proceed to the 5th floor and lead the Ladder 2/Engine 3 team out.

At 1952 hours, flames are reported venting from the roof. This photograph was taken at 2030 hours.

At 1915 hours, Car 2 who had assumed Operations, ordered all crews to cease using the saws in order to lower the noise in an attempt to help the team on the 5th floor identify the direction of the stairwell. Later that minute, the Lieutenant from Ladder 2 radios "Ladder 2 to Command were done . . .", and this was their final transmission. By 1918 hours the team from Engine 3 had reached the 5th floor stairwell door and listened and yelled for the team from Ladder 2/Engine 3. No one ever answered.

By 1945 hours, a mutual aid company from Millbury had arrived with their thermal imagining camera and a Worcester crew was assigned to lead them up for a search of the 5th floor. By now, lifelines tied to the to the stairwell were in mandatory use. The team was unable to go past the 3rd floor in the stairwell because of the heat. In addition, the thermal imagining camera stop working. It is believed that a thermal overload of the camera occurred.

	View from the I-270 highway.

The time is now 1951 hours. Several loud booms are heard which shake the building and the fire is now venting through the roof forty feet into the night sky. Large cracks in the buildings exterior brick walls are showing and concern is growing about a collapse. At 1958 hours the evacuation order is issued and all personnel are removed from the building. Apparatus were repositioned out of the collapse zone and to prepare for an extended defensive operation. The exterior attack continued for the next twenty hours.

A crane was brought in to remove the remains of the building. The exterior brick wall needed to be demolished for both safety and ease of operations, as  some floors had collapsed down onto each other. Fire crews from all over New England came into Worcester to help painstakingly and respectfully sift through the ruins to recover their fallen brothers, and to cover stations so Worcester firefighters could be available to work at the site.

The procession moves beneath an American flag hung from two Worcester aerials.

The tragedy that unfolded that night not only affected Worcester, Massachusetts, but was felt by the entire Nation and even beyond. On December 9, 1999, some 30,000 firefighters from all over the country and as far away as Canada, Australia and Ireland came to lend their support and pay their respects at a memorial service held for the six fallen firefighters. Some of the dignitaries who attended were President Bill Clinton, Vice-President Al Gore, and Massachusetts Senators Ted Kennedy and John Kerry, among many others.

	Firefighters march through the streets of Worcester.

A three-mile procession of firefighters and dignitaries marched to the Worcester Centrum for the service. An estimated 10,000 civilians lined the parade route to pay their respects. Firefighters in the procession continued to arrive at the Centrum well after it's 15,000 seats had been filled and the service started. Some firefighters who couldn't get in marched over to the smoldering shell of the Worcester Cold Storage building to pay their respects there.

Many of the 500 member Worcester Fire Department did not attend the memorial service, but instead chose to remain at the site and search for their missing brothers. It took eight days to recover all six firefighters, and this tragedy was the worst loss of life from a building fire in America for more than 20 years.

It is no secret to the fire service that abandoned buildings pose a serious hazard to firefighters operating in them. It's hard to imagine that any building could be worse than the Worcester Cold Storage building. For starters, the sprinkler system was inoperable due to abandonment and there was no detection system.

The building's construction and layout was a nightmare. The original section was built in 1906 and featured a single stairwell that reached all the way to the roof. Another section was added in 1912. Access to the new section was extremely limited. The two stairwells in the new section only went to the second and third floors. To reach the upper levels of the new section on foot, you had to climb the stairwell in the original section and cross over to the new section. There were elevators but they were inoperable at the time of the fire. Doorways between the the original and newer section varied in number and location on each level. Floor plans also varied between floors.

For the teams working above the third floor, there was only the stairwell in the original building to reach the ground or roof by because there were no windows. In addition, it was easy to become disoriented in the maze of refrigerated rooms. It is estimated that the crew from Rescue 1 who originally became lost was almost about as far from the stairwell on the 5th floor as they could be. On each floor of the building there was over 17,000 square feet of floor space to become lost in.

The building had undergone much renovation during it's lifetime. Many different types of insulation were used and added over the years. Unfortunately all of them had poor fire characteristics. It was the nature of these insulations that resisted extinguishment and caused rapid growth, high heat and large volumes of smoke.

A decal affixed to the back of a helmet, in honor of those who perished in the Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse fire on December 3, 1999.

The homeless couple inhabiting the building at the time of the fire were quickly identified, arrested, and charged with involuntary manslaughter for the deaths of the six firefighters. The court however ruled that their actions did not meet the standard of "wanton and reckless" conduct, as they were not obligated under Massachusetts law to report the fire. The indictments were subsequently dismissed.

An appeals court would later reinstate the charges. In the end a plea bargain was reached where both individuals would serve five years probation and have the charges dropped if they were to remain out of trouble. While this decision obviously inspired mixed feelings from the families and fellow firefighters of the fallen, and in the community and others within the fire service, the district attorney cited that because of both defendant's limited mental capacity, it was "just about impossible to try the case".

Firehouse.com in the Line of Duty: Tragedy in Worcester
Worcester Telegram & Gazette: Warehouse Tragedy
Tribute and Memorial information at www.fallen-heroes.org

NIOSH report on Worcester Cold Storage fire in HTML.
Worcester Fire Department Board of Inquiry Report: Worcester Cold Storage and Warehouse Fire in HTML and PDF formats
United States Fire Administration Technical Report Series: Abandoned Cold-Storage Warehouse Multi-Firefighter Fatality Fire in HTML and PDF formats